Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is actively lobbying for the Federal Reserve to expand its Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) Repo Facility, aiming to help Japan bolster its struggling yen without forcing outright sales of U.S. Treasurys. This strategic move, following a rare coordinated U.S.-Japan currency intervention, places new Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh in a crucial position to redefine the working relationship between the Treasury and the central bank. The outcome could significantly impact global financial diplomacy and influence U.S. borrowing costs.
The Federal Reserve finds itself potentially on the verge of a significant shift in its global role, as the Trump administration intensifies efforts to stabilize the embattled Japanese yen. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is championing an initiative that could see the traditionally apolitical Fed expand a crucial lending facility, allowing Japan to secure vital dollar liquidity without destabilizing the sensitive U.S. Treasurys market.
This bold request comes at a pivotal moment, coinciding with new Fed Chairman Kevin Warsh's stated ambition to redefine the intricate relationship between the Treasury and the central bank. The outcome of this high-stakes collaboration could reshape the management of the colossal $29 trillion Treasurys market and potentially cast the Fed in an unprecedented role as a pillar of U.S. financial diplomacy.
The internal dynamics within the Fed regarding major policy shifts remain uncertain, with the central bank declining to comment on the matter. Similarly, the Treasury has remained tight-lipped about its specific plans.

In a rare and significant move, the U.S. recently joined Japan in a foreign exchange intervention to support the struggling yen. While Japan frequently intervenes to prop up its currency, direct U.S. involvement is exceptionally uncommon, previously seen in major crises like the 2011 earthquake and tsunami recovery efforts. As Bessent announced in a post on X (formerly Twitter) on Sunday, "Friday's coordinated foreign exchange actions countered disorderly yen movements." The Treasury reportedly sold euros from its Exchange Stabilization Fund to fund these yen purchases, a detail reported by the Financial Times.
The Japanese yen has been on a precipitous slide since 2022, primarily due to the stark divergence in interest rates between the U.S. and Japan. Factors like Japan's colossal government debt, a shrinking and aging population, and surging energy import costs have compounded the currency's woes. Last week, the yen briefly touched 164 to the U.S. dollar, a 40-year low according to Factset data, before retreating to just under 157 after the joint intervention.
This intervention also carries implicit implications for the U.S. Treasury market. The significant interest rate differential has fueled a long-standing "carry trade," where investors borrow low-cost yen to invest in higher-yielding Treasurys or the booming U.S. tech sector. However, this trade has shown signs of stress, particularly with President Trump's trade policies prompting global investors to hedge their dollar exposures. As Torsten Slok, chief economist at Apollo Global Management, highlighted in a recent research note, "The yen carry trade has broken down." Reinvigorating the yen could help stabilize this trade, thereby bolstering demand for U.S. Treasurys.
The Treasury's method of intervention—selling euros rather than dollars—underscores its sensitivity to the U.S. bond market. Bessent's primary objective is to see Japan utilize and, crucially, for the Fed to "upsize" its Foreign and International Monetary Authorities (FIMA) Repo Facility. This facility enables foreign central banks to temporarily swap their U.S. Treasurys for dollars, rather than being forced into outright sales. Such sales can depress Treasury prices, pushing yields higher and consequently increasing U.S. borrowing costs—a metric Bessent closely monitors, especially after the 10-year note briefly surpassed 4.7% last week.
While the Fed often acts to stabilize global financial systems during crises, the long-term pressure on Japan's currency doesn't neatly fit the typical definition of a market liquidity crisis. Japan does possess access to Fed swap lines for dollar liquidity, but notably chose not to use them this time. Brad Setser, a former Treasury official and now with the Council on Foreign Relations, commented on X that "the current norm is that the central bank swaps are used to fund dollar lender of last resort type activity, not intervention."
The FIMA facility currently has a $60 billion per-counterpart daily limit, while Japan holds approximately $1.1 trillion in U.S. Treasurys, and recent interventions were estimated at $60-80 billion. An expansion of FIMA could broadly ease U.S. fiscal pressures by making the Treasury market more attractive to international holders.
This proposal, despite its potential economic and political appeal, ventures into what typically falls outside the Fed's traditional remit. Any expansion of FIMA would necessitate a vote by the Federal Open Market Committee. However, Chairman Warsh might see merit in it, aligning with his pre-chairmanship stance on revising the Treasury-Fed Accord. During his confirmation process in April, Warsh indicated a willingness for the Fed to defer to the Treasury on international finance matters: "Fed officials are not entitled to the same special deference in areas affecting international finance, among other matters. In those matters, the Fed will work with the Administration and with Congress."
This renewed spirit of collaboration between Warsh and Bessent—who reportedly maintain frequent contact beyond their scheduled weekly breakfasts—could pave the way for broader cooperation. It might even influence decisions on requests like the United Arab Emirates' push for its own Fed swap line, a matter that would traditionally be at the Fed's discretion.
